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지문 분석결과
fico가 지문 학습에 필요한 것들을 구성하여 학습 효율성을 제공해 드립니다.
노트나 질문을 통해 자신만의 지문 노트를 만들어 관리해 보세요.
충남외고1 기말 / 공통영어 외부지문 충남외고1 기말 / 공통영어 외부지문
충남외고1 기말 / 공통영어 외부지문
충남외고1 기말 / 공통영어 외부지문
Market Enforcement - 1-4
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문장 선택
문장을 클릭하면 해당 문장의 구문 분석 내용을 보여줍니다.
Market Enforcement - 1-4
1. It is well known that markets can self-enforce contracts. Punishment of cheaters, through lost future trade, encourages cooperation between contracting parties (Klein and Leffler 1981; Kreps 1990; Shapiro 1983; Williamson 1979). This market enforcement is most effective where information about cheating is good and a frequent and long-lived relationship is desired—conditions routinely met in farmland contracts. 2. Farmers are often part of a small community of people who have known each other most of their lives. Farmers tend to have lived their entire lives at a single location and farm families have known each other for generations. Information travels fast in such a community, and people are quickly aware of anyone who cheats another and tend to avoid future dealings with that person. Thus, for both a landowner and a farmer, a long-term interest exists in maintaining a good relationship. 3. The potential for market enforcement is greater when contracting parties have developed reputations for honesty. Reputation that can be devalued when contracts are breached; and farmers and landowners develop reputations for honesty by yielding high-quality crops, and consistently demonstrating that they are good at what they do. In small, close-knit farming communities, reputations are well known. Over time landowners indirectly monitor farmers by observing the reported output, the general quality of the soil, and any unusual or extreme behavior. 4. Farmer and landowner reputations act as a bond. In any growing season a farmer can reduce effort, exploit soil, or underrropert the crop. Similarly, a landowner can undermaintain fences, ditches, and irrigation systems. Accurate assessments of farmer and landowner behavior will be made over time, and those farmers and landowners who attempt to gain at each other's expense will find that others may refuse to deal with them in the future.
지문 노트목록 지문단위의 해석이나 의미 등 내용에 대한 설명입니다.
지문에 대한 질문목록 이 지문과 관련된 질문이 있다면 이곳에서 등록해 보세요. (예를들면, 이 지문과 관련된 문제 풀이가 궁금할 때)
지문에 사용된 특정 문장에 대한 궁금증은 해당 문장의 헬프fico쌤에 등록하는 것이 좋습니다.
등록된 질문이 없습니다.
fico 문장 분석
이 지문에 대해 AI는 다음과 같은 문장들로 구분하였습니다.
문장 구분과 분석의 정확성을 높이려면 'fico 정확성을 높이려면'을 참고하세요
list_alt해석 목록
여러 AI의 해석들을 제공해 드립니다.
inventory_2단어 목록 ● 단어 목록에 OpenVocas로 등록된 구가 있습니다.
문장에서 등장하는 단어를 fico가 대신 검색하여 제공해 드립니다. 단어를 눌러서 발음을 들어보세요.
해당 문장에서 fico AI가 설정한 난이도 이상의 단어를 찾지 못했습니다.
sticky_note_2노트 메모
학습에 필요한 나만의 메모를 남겨보세요.
tips_and_updates인덱스 핑거
현재 문장과 유사한 구조를 가지거나 보충 학습할 수 있는 예문들을 추천합니다.
원문과 유사한 fico score 및 구문 구조를 갖는 문장이 없을 경우 검색되지 않을 수 있습니다.
해당 문장에서 fico AI가 설정한 난이도 이상의 단어를 찾지 못했습니다.
듣기
상세한 구문 분석을 보고 싶은 문장을 선택하세요.
1 1. 2 It is well known that markets can self-enforce contracts. 3 Punishment of cheaters, through lost future trade, encourages cooperation between contracting parties (Klein and Leffler 1981; Kreps 1990; Shapiro 1983; Williamson 1979). 4 This market enforcement is most effective where information about cheating is good and a frequent and long-lived relationship is desired—conditions routinely met in farmland contracts. 5 2. 6 Farmers are often part of a small community of people who have known each other most of their lives. 7 Farmers tend to have lived their entire lives at a single location and farm families have known each other for generations. 8 Information travels fast in such a community, and people are quickly aware of anyone who cheats another and tend to avoid future dealings with that person. 9 Thus, for both a landowner and a farmer, a long-term interest exists in maintaining a good relationship. 10 3. 11 The potential for market enforcement is greater when contracting parties have developed reputations for honesty. 12 Reputation that can be devalued when contracts are breached; and farmers and landowners develop reputations for honesty by yielding high-quality crops, and consistently demonstrating that they are good at what they do. 13 In small, close-knit farming communities, reputations are well known. 14 Over time landowners indirectly monitor farmers by observing the reported output, the general quality of the soil, and any unusual or extreme behavior. 15 4. 16 Farmer and landowner reputations act as a bond. 17 In any growing season a farmer can reduce effort, exploit soil, or underrropert the crop. 18 Similarly, a landowner can undermaintain fences, ditches, and irrigation systems. 19 Accurate assessments of farmer and landowner behavior will be made over time, and those farmers and landowners who attempt to gain at each other's expense will find that others may refuse to deal with them in the future.